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THE PERFORMANCE OF NEWLY AUTONOMOUS STATE AGENCIES IN 
INDONESIA: A CASE STUDY ON 13 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
HOSPITALS 
 
by 
 
Taufik Damhuri 
 
 
The creation of autonomous state agencies has been diffused all around the 
world as one of the major government reform agenda. Even though each country has 
different characteristic of the autonomous state agencies, the main idea remains the 
same. It is believed that the major cause why government agencies become slow, 
inefficient and cumbersome is the constraint. By removing that constraint and 
strengthening the accountability, it is expected that the performance of government 
agencies will improve. 
With the same expectation in June 2005 under the big framework financial 
reform agenda, Indonesia created autonomous state agencies named Public Service 
Agencies. After five years, 104 government agencies have received permit to become 
Public Service Agencies. However, until now we still do not know whether this 
program is successful or not. Is it true that after transformation the performance of the 
agencies will improve? There is no single evaluation that has been done to compare 
pre- and post- transformation.  
iii 
 
This thesis tries to examine the performance of autonomous state agencies in 
Indonesia. The sample data from 13 central government hospitals that automatically 
transformed in June 2005 might be not enough to represent the change of performance 
from all the agencies that have been transforming, and the performance indicator is 
highly related with the type of service, so this research could only represent the 
change of performance in healthcare service. 
The writer examined the performance of the hospital covering period from 
2001 to 2009, using statistic test individual t-test and wilcoxon signed rank test to test 
the significant of changes, and replicated the process that have been done by Marthur 
and Banchuenvijit (2007). The writer found the significant increase in the number of 
patient, but this positive growth does not accompanied by the improvement in other 
indicators such as profitability indicator and liquidity indicator. This condition caused 
the overall performance of the health care service not change significantly after 
transformation; the increasing number of patient happened more likely because of the 
change of habit of the doctor by stop referring their patients to other hospitals. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The creation of autonomous state agencies has been diffused all around the 
world as one of the government reform agenda, government service always perceptive 
as slow, inefficient, and cumbersome. The main objective of this reform agenda is to 
create innovative and result-oriented public service. Another factor that encourages 
this movement is the increased global competitiveness, increasing government deficit, 
and demand for better public service (Thomas, 2006). 
Wilson (1989) mentions that the main factors that cause government less 
efficient compared to private sector are because by government agency has more 
goals and constraints. Private sectors have a simple objective, their objective is only 
to create profit in the most effective and efficient way. While public managers have 
more complicated objective, compliance to the regulations are more important rather 
than create profit. The regulations are created to reduce the arbitrariness
1
 of the 
officer but it creates tradeoff, reduces efficiency and responsiveness of the agency; 
that is why government agency is well known for its inefficiency and cumbersome. 
This condition also happens in Indonesia. Government agencies should meet so many 
procedures and regulations that control the daily operation, such as procurement 
regulation
2
, Non-Tax Revenue spending procedures
3
, rigid budget document revision 
                                           
 
 
1 Arbitrary refer to official acting without legal authority, or with that authority in a way 
that offends our sense of justice. 
2 Procurement regulation is Keppres 80/2003, this regulation required the agency to 
conduct competitive bidding to provide equal chances to all contractors, and provide job 
to the lowest bidder. Because this regulation is too rigid in the implementation 
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procedures, government employee payroll system, employee recruitment procedures, 
and many more regulations that agency should obey. 
The main idea of creation autonomous state agencies is trying to remove all 
the constraints that cause government agencies become inefficient. By doing this, it is 
expected that public managers can be more focus on their goal, more responsive to 
people need, and minimize political interference. Autonomous state agencies still 
work at arm’s length of government, but they were given some managerial autonomy 
to carry out public task (Thiel, 2009). 
Although the characteristic of autonomous state agencies are different in 
every country
4
 (Pollitt et al. 2004), the main idea remains the same, that is “letting 
managers manage” and “making managers manage” (Shick, 1996). The central 
government or head of department gives more autonomy to the manager of the agency. 
In return they signed contractual performance agreement, where they promise to 
improve the performance of their agency. Granting more autonomy in operation is 
believed will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the government and also 
improve the quality of the services. 
Inspired by the movement of bureaucratic reform in developed country, in 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
procurement process become inefficient because it cost a lot of time and money to held 
single auction process. 
3 Non-tax revenue spending procedures requires all agencies deposited all of his revenue 
in state treasury account, the can use their revenue if the activity already planned in 
budget document. The problem occur when the condition in the field is not same as the 
expected one when the budget document is made, because of that many agencies 
become slow and cumbersome. 
4 Executive Agency in UK, Next Step Agency in US, and Special Operating Agency in 
Canada are non discrete organization. But Independent Administrative Institute in Japan is 
independent public bodies, legally separated body from head department (Kiyoshi, 2006)    
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2003 Indonesia reformed their agencies by issuing three packages of States Financial 
Law
5
. Under this three regulations Indonesia has new paradigm in state financial 
management that is result based oriented, professionalism, and accountability and 
transparency.  
Those three fundamental principles become the basis for setting new type of 
government agencies that give flexibility in the operation and financial management 
by emphasizing productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness. Each country has different 
name for this new entity, in Canada has been known as Special Operating Agencies 
(SOAs), United Kingdom labels it as Next Step Agencies, United States calls it 
Independent Agencies, in Indonesia it is called Public Service Agencies (PSAs)   
The characteristic of Public Service Agencies are similar to Special Operating 
Agencies in Canada. These organizations are non separating government agencies, so 
it still has responsibilities to the line ministries. The government gives some level of 
managerial flexibility in exchange of promise to improve their service quality and 
financial performance. 
The first Public Service Agencies were created in June 2005, when 
government regulation no 23/2005 was issued. Thirteen Central Government 
Hospitals that previously had legal entity as PERJAN
6
 were automatically changed 
into Public Service Agency. Even though this policy has been carried out for five 
years, the successful rate of the program is still a big question. There is no single 
evaluation that has been done to these types of organizations. Public skeptics about 
                                           
 
 
5 Three packages of state financial Law is Act Number 17/2003, Act Number 1 /2004, and 
Act Number 15/2004 
6 PERJAN is one type of State Owned Enterprises with characteristic non discrete 
organization. In 2003 State Owned Enterprise eliminate this type of organization. 
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the successfulness of this program, some of regulators already try to cancel some of 
the flexibility because they think that there are no linkage flexibility and performance. 
Evaluation is difficult because there are no clear criteria about the performance of 
government agencies: what are the indicators, how to measure it, and how can we say 
that it already successful. The purpose of this paper is trying to answer all of these 
problems, by taking 13 central government hospitals that automatically transformed 
into Public Service Agencies in 2005 as the sample. The performance indicator highly 
depends on the type of service provided. This research might not be enough to answer 
the impact of transformation to all type of organization, but it is enough to see the 
impact of transformation on health care service.  
Figure1  
Summary the Reason of Creation of ASAs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTERNAL REASON 
PROBLEM IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
 Low quality of service 
 Slow 
 Inefficient 
 Cumbersome 
 
EXTERNAL REASON 
 Increased global competitiveness 
 Increasing government deficit 
 Public demand for better service 
 Remove some constraint 
 Give manager operational flexibility 
 Strengthening accountability for the 
result 
EXPECTED RESULT 
 Manager focus on their goals 
 More responsive 
 Better service 
 Efficient and effective 
 Transparent and accountable 
AUTONOMOUS STATE AGENCIES 
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CHAPTER 2 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Hospitals 
The Hospitals are business entities that provide health care service to the 
society. Hospital management is very unique in sense of setting goal. As a business 
entity their goal is to generate profit so they could change and upgrade their facilities 
to improve the service quality and to make sure that the organization is going concern. 
On the other side as a health care service provider they also have social missions to 
provide health treatment to all people equally; they cannot reject to provide health 
care service to the poor only because these people cannot pay for the service. Each 
hospital has their own preferred goal and it is highly depends on the type of the 
hospital and the owners. 
Figure2 
The Type of Hospitals Based on the Owner 
 
 
In 2009, the number of hospitals in Indonesia was 1523 hospitals (MOH, 
2010), this figure increased 11% (151 hospitals) from previous year. Of the total 1532 
hospitals, 552 of them are owned by central government and local government. These 
type of hospitals are called government hospitals. 125 hospitals are controlled by 
36%
8%5%
50%
Government 
Military 
State Owned Enterprise 
Private 
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military institutions such as police or army. 78 hospitals are owned by State Owned 
Enterprise. And the rest 768 hospitals are owned by private sector. 
Government hospitals have a function to provide health care services to 
public, especially to the poor. This type of hospital is required to provide third class 
in-patient facilities with at least 25% of the capacity. Theoretically all the poor that 
come to third class in-patient facilities guaranteed to get free health care service, the 
government promised to pay all the charge.  
Hospital funding comes from two sources: from the government, and from 
the patients. The fund from the government is distinguished into two types, the first 
type is allocated on a regular basis every year through the budget document whose the 
budget allocation could be in form of operation subsidy or investment subsidy; and 
the purpose of this subsidy is to make sure government hospitals service fares still 
affordable by the public. The second type of government subsidy is a special program. 
This special program is not always held every year because it depends on President 
Policy, for example, current five year policy is to provide free health care service to 
people who have income below poverty line. This people will receive a special 
purposes card, which can be used if they go to the hospital, the payment will use 
reimbursement method so the patient will not be charged for the service. For this 
second type of government subsidy the patient can choose any type of hospital, so the 
patient does not necessarily go to the government hospitals only. 
The fund from patient is obtained in the form of fee for service. The hospitals 
usually have four classes of services, the lowest one is the third class, followed by 
second class, next is first class and the best class is VIP. All patients in every class 
receive same health treatment; the differences are in the number of bed and the 
facilities in the room. For government hospitals the fares are based on calculation of 
- 7 - 
unit cost. The third class fare is unit cost less subsidy, the second class fares is unit 
cost recovery, and for first class and VIP fares is unit cost plus profit. What 
distinguish government hospitals with other types of hospitals are they work at arm’s 
length of government, and to operate the hospitals they must follow rigid procedures 
as government institutions. Therefore, government hospitals are still considered to 
have low service quality. 
Military hospitals in some ways are similar with government hospitals; the 
source of fund comes from Government Subsidy and patient income. The difference is 
that the operators of the hospitals are come from military, and the patients are mainly 
come from military or people who are in trouble with law. 
The hospitals owned by State Owned Enterprises are different from hospitals 
that have legal entity as State Owned Enterprises. This type of hospitals is built and 
owned by State Owned Enterprises but they have discrete management. In addition, 
the parent organization didn’t give any subsidy, so this type of hospital is a purely 
profit-oriented organization. However, the employee of parent organization will get 
special discount. 
The last type is private hospitals. Even though this type of hospitals is a 
purely profit-oriented organization, the government still requires them to provide the 
third class in-patient facilities, at least 10% of the capacity. Few of the hospitals also 
run government program to provide healthcare service to the poor, they will receive 
the payment from government through insurance company using reimbursement 
method. 
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2.2 Outline of Autonomous State Agencies in Indonesia 
2.2.1 Agencies in Financial Reform Agenda 
One of the Indonesian financial reform agenda is the transformation from 
“Cost Based Budgeting” to “Performance Based Budgeting”. With this new budgeting 
system, budget allocation is no longer focusing on input side (how much money will 
spend?) but more focused on output and outcome (what the target need to achieve?). 
Government expects that with this new system agencies will spend the money more 
efficiently because every monetary unit’s expense will be accounted for. Further-more, 
government expects that this new system will become a solution to improve the 
service quality.  
This new budgeting approach is suitable for the agencies that provide goods and 
service to the society such as hospital and university whose targets and products are 
very clear. This performance based budgeting is regulates by Law Number 17/2003 
article 14 which states that every government agency must make budget planning 
based on the performances that want to be achieved. 
Law Number 1/2004 provides the foundation to create autonomous state 
agencies in Indonesia called Public Service Agencies, in order to improve efficiency 
and service quality. This organization is non discrete type, so even though they are 
given some managerial freedom (flexibility), they are still accountable to their line 
ministries. 
With basic principles that are stated on both regulations, in June 2005 by 
Government Regulation Number 23/2005 new agency called Public Service Agencies 
(PSA) was born. Under this new type of organization, government agencies 
implement the performance based budgeting that combined with managerial 
flexibility in return for stronger accountability for the result. It is expected that Public 
- 9 - 
Service Agencies will become pioneer in public sector financial management reform 
to improve efficiency and service quality of the government agencies. 
2.2.2 The Flexibility of Public Service Agency  
In order to improve the performance of Public Service Agencies, they are 
granted ten flexibilities. These flexibilities are regulated by Government Regulation 
Number 23/2005. Some flexibility needs more detailed technical procedures or 
regulations to implement; the detailed procedures must be issued by the Ministry of 
Finance. 
The first flexibility is freedom to hold their revenue. Based on Government 
Regulation Number 23/2005 article 14, Public Service Agencies can keep all their 
revenue on registered bank account; they are released from the obligation to transfer 
their entire revenue to treasury account. For regular government agencies, they must 
transfer all their revenue to treasury account within 24 hours the longest, and they can 
withdraw it using the procedures of non-tax revenue (PNBP). Many government 
agencies complain about this procedure because not all revenue can be withdrawn, 
only few revenue types that have been set by Government Regulation
7
 (PP) that can 
be drawn, others than that categorized as general revenue
8
 cannot be withdrawn. This 
condition causes many government facilities unable to fully utilize. By giving the 
flexibilities government expects that managers could maximize the use of their 
facilities to obtain additional fund so it can reduce state budget burden. 
                                           
 
 
7 Government Regulation is signed by President. But before president could signed the 
draft, the house of representative must be agree first, thats why government regulations 
that regulate the tariffs took a long period of time to issued. 
8 The example of general revenue is room rent, building rent, and other asset rent as long 
as their main public task is not lending government asset. 
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The second flexibility is freedom to spend money. Based on Government 
Regulation Number 23/2005 article 15 and the Ministry of Finance Regulation 
Number 44/PMK.05/2009, Public Service Agencies spending is allowed to exceed 
budget ceiling on budget document as long as the source of fund is derived from 
agencies revenue (non-tax revenue and non government grant) and it is still under 
threshold. The revision of budget document (DIPA) can be done later before mid 
December. Many government agencies are complaining about red tape in the revision 
of budget document. Regular agencies are forbidden to do some activities that are not 
allocated in budget document. Sometimes, revision process takes a long period of 
time that causes the revised budget document to be issued at the end of the year; so it 
is difficult to spend the money. This condition is also happen to activities funded by 
grants, that is why many donor countries refuse to provide grants in form of money, 
they prefer to give goods or services. This flexibility is expected to increase agency 
responsiveness. 
The third flexibility is freedom to conduct short term investment. Based on 
Government Regulation Number 23/2005 article 16, Public Service Agency could 
keep their money on registered bank account and could manage their idle cash to 
invest on low risk financial investment, such as a term deposits or government bond. 
The revenue from the investment can be treated as additional revenue. Regular 
government agencies treat interest as general revenue type so they could not use it. 
The forth flexibility is freedom to lend. Based on Government Regulation 
Number 23/2005 article 17, Public Service Agencies are allowed to provide receivable 
to customer. This flexibility is given due to consideration that some of the goods and 
services (health and education) are provided to the poor and sometimes they could not 
pay it. The agencies cannot reject to provide the service because it has already become 
- 11 - 
the responsibility of the government to provide service to the poor. When the 
customer could not paid in time the agencies treat it as receivable. The central 
government sometimes reimburses this receivable if the receivable is from the the 
poor who have a social security number. If they did not have the social security 
number they can pay it in installment, but if they still cannot pay it the agency is 
allowed to write off receivable based on the level of authority as stipulated in Ministry 
of Finance Regulation Number 230/PMK.05/2009. 
The fifth flexibility is freedom to acquire debt. Based on Government 
Regulation Number 23/2005 article 18, Public Service Agencies could have short term 
debt to finance operational expenditure and long term debt to finance investment 
expenditure. Short term debt is needed to handle cash shortage that is under certain 
condition when the agencies do not have enough cash to buy goods or services, but 
the goods and services are important to make sure daily operation run well; then, the 
agencies are allowed to buy those goods and services by credit to the supplier. 
Flexibility to obtain long term debt is given due to consideration that the increasing 
budget deficit might caused the government unable to allocate capital expenditure so 
the agency could seek third party fund to finance their capital expenditure. Although 
government regulation number 23/2005 already gives permission to the Public 
Service Agencies to have long term debt, detail technical procedures for long term 
debt have not been issued yet. Ministry of Finance Regulation Number 
77/PMK.05/2009 only regulates short term debt, so until now public service agencies 
cannot implement the flexibilities for long term one. 
The sixth flexibility is freedom to set customize procurement procedures. Based 
on Government Regulation Number 23/2005 article 20 and the Ministry of Finance 
Regulation Number 08/PMK.02/2006, the procurement process in Public Service 
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Agencies is allowed to be exempted from the provision applicable to the procurement 
procedures in government sector (President Decree Number 80/2003) if Public 
Service Agencies could prove that the new procurement process is more effective and 
efficient. The regular procurement procedure in government sector (President Decree 
Number 80/2003) is well known for its rigidity; they set the same standard for all 
government types. The regular government procedure is good for non service type of 
government agencies, because it took a long period of time for procurement process, 
beside that the price ceiling for each type of procurement process is too small. 
The seventh flexibility is freedom to manage the asset and write-off inventory. 
Based on Government Regulation Number 23/2005 article 21, Public Service 
Agencies could write off inventories based on economic consideration such as being 
expired, obsolete, or no longer can be used. Regular government agencies must pass 
through long bureaucratic process to write off expired or obsolete inventories, so it is 
easier for them to pile up in the warehouse causing inefficient usage of warehouse. 
The freedom to manage fixed asset still become controversy in the Ministry of 
Finance because Directorate General of State Assets still does not agree to provide 
flexibility on the freedom to manage the asset or to make cooperation with the third 
party to build fixed asset such as build transfer operate (BTO), build operate transfer 
(BOT), or fixed asset leasing. The Directorate General of State Asset thinks that is too 
risky if the agencies have this flexibility, they are afraid of misusing the asset or 
lawsuit from the third party.  
The eighth flexibility is freedom to hire professional employee. Based on 
Government Regulation Number 23 /2005 article 33, in order to improve 
professionalism of Public Service Agencies, they can hire non civil servant 
professional employee. Regular government agencies could not quickly recruit new 
- 13 - 
employee, they should be publish recruitment process in national mass media, and the 
procurement process itself takes a long period time. If the agencies are not satisfied 
with the newly hired employees, they cannot easily fired that employee because when 
people become civil servant they have a life time guarantee not to get fired as long 
they do not break any law. This condition causes government employees become 
unprofessional, lazy and unproductive. 
The ninth flexibility is get remuneration. Based on Government Regulation 
Number 23/2005 article 35, the management and employee of Public Service 
Agencies could get remuneration in the form of salary, fixed allowance, honorarium, 
incentive, bonus for achievement, sovereign, or pensions. The purpose of this 
remuneration is to increase professionalism and motivation of the employee to serve 
well. The salary of regular government employee is too small, it is even not enough to 
full-fill basic necessity. This condition cause many government agencies try find side 
job and encourage them to corruption.  
The tenth flexibility is easiness to set custom service fares. Based on 
Government Regulation Number 23/2005 article 9, Public Service Agencies could 
impose service fares based on unit cost calculation and these fares could set only by 
the Minister of Finance. Fares for regular government agencies must be approved by 
house of representative and set by government regulation (signed by President). In 
average it takes more than three years to set fares for regular government agencies. 
When the fares are set, it is already underrate and not enough to cover daily 
operational cost. Even though Public Service Agencies could easily customize their 
fares, they still could not act arbitrary on it because before new fares are signed by the 
Minister of Finance, it must be evaluated first by selected task force to make sure the 
new fares will not become the burden for the poor. 
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The difference between regular government agencies and Public Service 
Agencies are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Difference between Regular Government Agencies and Public Service Agencies 
 
  REGULAR 
GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES  
PUBLIC SERVICE 
AGENCIES  
1 Revenue  Must be deposited in 
treasury account as soon as 
possible and can be use it by 
using “non-tax revenue” 
spending procedures  
Can be kept in registered 
bank account and be used 
in the most effective and  
efficient way to achieve 
target in planning 
document  
2 Expenditure  Must comply to budget 
document, can be revised 
but it cost lot of time and 
money  
Can spend exceed budget 
ceiling and flexible to 
revised as long consistent 
with organization objective 
and can be accounted  
3 Cash management  Cannot hold cash in hand or 
bank more than allowed 
amount  
Flexibility to conduct short 
term investment and 
manage the cash according 
to organization requirement  
4 Receivable 
management  
Cannot have receivable  Could give receivable in 
order to improve 
government service  
5 Debt management  Cannot have debt  To handle short time deficit 
could borrow money  
6 Procurement 
procedures  
Must accordance rigid 
government regulation 
(KEPPRES 80)  
Could make customize 
asset management that 
suitable for organization  
7 Asset management  Don’t have autonomy  Have a freedom to 
maximize utilize their asset 
such as rent it, and PSA 
could write off inventory if 
it is needed  
8 Human resources  Human resources are all 
civil servants  
Could recruit professional 
employee to improve 
performance  
9 Remuneration  Salary according to standard 
government salaries  
Could propose 
performance based salaries 
that higher than original  
10 Service fares  Service fares must be based 
on government regulation 
that need legislative 
agreement  
Fares set by Ministry of 
Finance  
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2.2.3 Implementation of Public Service Agencies 
Not every government agency can easily become Public Service Agencies. Only 
government agency that has met the substantive, technical, and administrative 
requirements that can became Public Service Agencies. 
Substantive requirements are met if the government agency conducts public 
service related to providing goods or services (such as hospital or university), control 
special economic zone (such as free port zone), or manage special fund (such as 
revolving fund). 
Technical requirements are met if the service performance of government 
agency could be enhanced by transforming it into Public Service Agency, and in the 
current condition the agency has a good financial performance. 
Administrative requirements are met if government agency present six 
documents that explained about past condition, current condition and the target 
(promise) that want to achieve by the agencies if they transform to public service 
agencies. The documents are a contractual performance agreement, organization 
structure, business strategic plan, financial report, minimum service standard, and the 
latest audit report or statement of willingness to audit. 
Every government agencies who want to become public service agencies 
must receive approval from their line ministries. The line ministries will evaluate their 
substantive requirement and technical requirement. If the agency already passes the 
evaluation, then the line minister will send the proposal along with six documents of 
administrative requirements to Finance Minister. Before finance minister give 
approval, he/she will ask recommendation from the assessment task force. 
- 16 - 
The assessment task force
9
 will evaluate the documents of administrative 
requirement, evaluation focused on the performance target of the agency under four 
dimension service, finance, human resources, and administrative. If the task force 
thinks the agency is ready and feasible to become public service agency, they will 
send recommendation letter to Finance Minister, if he agrees to the recommendation 
he will issue Finance Minister Decree. 
Figure 3 
Summary of Evaluation Process to Become PSAs 
 
Agencies Line Ministries 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Evaluation Task 
Force 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Based on the recommendation of the task force, there are two type of public 
service agency, the first type is have full flexibility, while the second type only get 
                                           
 
 
9 Assessment task force member is representatives from each directorate general under 
Ministry of Finance that linked with the flexibility. 
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half flexibility
10
. Public service agencies that received half of the flexibility is the 
agencies that fulfill all requirements, but the task force did not satisfied with the 
quality of administrative requirement, they think that the organization is feasible to 
become public service agency but the human resource is not ready. Public service 
agencies with half of the flexibility give a chance to improve in two years, if within 
the period they did not make any progress, all the flexibility will be written off so they 
became regular government agencies again. 
At the early stage 13 central government hospitals that have legal entity as 
PERJAN automatically transformed to Public Service Agency in June 2005, but it is 
effectively implemented in January 2006 (Law 23/2005). Until November 2010 there 
are 104 government agencies that have transformed into Public Service Agencies, 
most of them provide health service (41.3%) and education service (41.3%). 
 
2.3 Performance: Definition and Dimension 
The main objective of creating Public Service Agencies is to improve service 
quality and operating efficiency in government organization. Performance dimension 
(service quality and efficiency) for Public Service Agency is highly dependent on 
what type of service provided. Reconsidering the availability of data (four years 
before and four years after), in this paper the writer focuses on the evaluation of 13 
central government hospitals that set automatically become public service agency in 
June 2005. So in this paper the writer is going to use performance definition and 
dimension for health care service (hospital). 
 
                                           
 
 
10 Public Service Agency with half of flexibility only did not receive flexibility in Debt 
Management, Procurement procedures, and aset management 
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2.3.1 Service Quality 
Health care service quality refers to satisfaction level, it is measure the ability of 
hospital to satisfy the patient as their main customer, it is evaluate doctor attitude, 
nurse treatment, hospital cleanliness, waiting time, cost and benefit of the treatment, 
and include hospital hospitality. Generally to measure hospital service quality we 
must take satisfaction survey, but due to constraint of location and time, survey 
method is difficult to implement. 
Reconsidering that limitation writer try to find alternative way to measure 
hospital service quality. Based on some studies high level customer satisfaction will 
lead to higher customer loyalty which in turn, lead to higher profits (Homburt et al., 
2005). For private sector hospital fares might play an important role in increasing 
profit, but for PSAs Hospital fares are controlled by Ministry of Finance, so any 
increasing fares must be approved first, so price factor can be control. Other people 
might think that the hospital could do some bad thing in order to increase fares such 
as lengthened stay in hospital that causing overstay of the patient or use over-
prescription, this thing might be success to increase hospital profit in a short run, but 
people have a freedom to choose hospital they will compare one hospital to another 
hospital, so in the long run people will start realize that they have been cheated, and 
the result is as expected the profit that previously increase will decrease again. Using 
this assumption, writer tries to analyze improvement in service quality through 
hospital financial performance and growth in the number of patient. 
Writer use CAH Financial Indicator Report©  to analyze financial performance. 
This indicator has been used to measure financial performance for Critical Access 
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Hospitals (CAHs)
11
 in USA. The indicator developed by University of Carolina at 
Chapel Hill supported by a technical advisory group of individuals with extensive 
experience in rural hospital finance and operations. 
Originally CAH Financial Indicator Report©  has 20 indicator under five 
performance dimension of profitability, liquidity, capital structure, activity, and other, 
but due to difference financial report system some of the data are not available, so 
writer only can use eight indicator from three performance dimension profitability, 
liquidity, and activity (revenue and cost). 
Profitability dimension measure the ability of hospital to generate revenue using 
available resources. Under this dimension writer use three indicators, first Total 
Margin Indicator, it is measures the control of expense relative to revenue, second 
Cash Flow Margin Indicator, it is measure hospital ability to generate cash flow from 
providing patient care service, third Return on Equity Indicator, it is measure the net 
income generated by equity investment (fund balance) 
Liquidity dimension measure the hospital ability to meet cash obligation in 
timely matter. Under this dimension writer use two indicators, first Day Cash on Hand 
Indicator measures the number of days an organization could operate if no cash was 
collected or received. Second Net Days Revenue in Account Receivable Indicator 
measure the number of days that it takes an organization to collect its receivables 
Revenue dimension measure the amount and mix of different source of 
revenue. Under this dimension writer use two indicators, first Outpatient Revenue to 
Total Revenue, these Indicator measures the percentage of total revenue that is 
                                           
 
 
11 Critical Access Hospital is a hospital that receives cost based reimbursement by 
Medicare. The purpose of this aid is to improve financial performance of the hospital. 
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sourced from outpatient revenue. Second Patient Deduction Indicator measures the 
allowances and discount per monetary unit of total patient revenue. 
Cost dimension measure the amount and mix of different types of cost. Under 
this dimension writer only use one indicator, Salaries to Total Expense Indicator 
measure the percentage of total expense that are paid as labor cost. 
2.3.2 Efficiency 
In a term of economic scale Efficiency refers to the amount of ratio resourced 
used to produce a certain number of outputs, smaller the number means that 
organization is more efficient (Wilson, 1989). For government agency it is a little bit 
difficult to link between input and output, especially in hospital, usually they have a 
multiple service (some of the hospital have more than 100 type of service) that use 
same input (resources), the other way to analyze efficiency is evaluate how hospital 
maximizing the usage of their resources. Hospitals have much kind of resources that 
depend on the service they provide, so it is difficult if we evaluate the usage on every 
resource. So for the analysis writer decides to choose 
resources that are generally owned and use by every hospital it is doctor, nurse, and 
bed.  
Ministry of health of Indonesia use indicator such as Bed Occupancy Rate 
(BOR), Length of Stay (LOS), Turn over Interval (TOI) and Bed Turn Over (BTO) to 
measure hospital facilities utilization level (MOH, 2008), all four indicator measure 
the level of bed utilization in hospital, this indicator might be not enough to represent 
hospital efficiency, so writer use another four indicator to measure hospital efficiency, 
it is Outpatient-doctor ratio, Outpatient-nurse ratio, Inpatient-doctor ratio, Inpatient-
nurse ratio, this four new indicator measure the amount of patients that handle by each 
doctor and nurse in outpatient service and inpatient service. 
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Bed Occupancy Rate (BOR) is the ratio of inpatient service days to bed count 
days in the period under consideration. Ministry of Health of Indonesia set an optimal 
value for BOR is 60 – 85 %. 
Average Length of Stay (AvLOS) is the average length of stay for hospital 
inpatients discharged during a given period of time. Ministry of Health of Indonesia 
set an optimal day number for AvLOS is 6 – 9 day. 
Turn Over Interval (TOI) is the average number of times a bed changes 
occupants during a given period of time. Ministry of Health of Indonesia set an 
optimal day for bed not occupied is 1 – 3 day. 
Bed Turn Over (BTO) is the number of times a bed, on average, changes 
occupants during a given period of time or the average number of admissions per bed 
per time period. Ministry of Health of Indonesia set an optimal turnover rate for one 
bed is 40-50 time. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
 
Kiyoshi Yakamoto (2006) suggest that granting more autonomy in 
management operation will make government agencies perform better, they will 
provide better service and operate more effectively and efficiently. More-over 
Michael Thomas (1996) mention that many governments all around the world try to 
adopt this kind of policy due to a numbers of reasons, such as “increased global 
competitiveness, increasing government deficit, and the demand for better service”. 
Reconsidering that reason, it is believed the transformation will lead to the 
better government agencies, they will provide better service quality that shown by 
improvement in financial indicator, and operate more efficient that shown by optimal 
resource utilization. 
Profitability dimension show the ability of hospital to generate revenue using 
available resources, if the agencies able to maximize the utilization of their facilities, 
they can reduce unit cost per patient, so total margin indicator (TM), cash flow margin 
indicator (CFM), and Return on Equity indicator (ROE) after agencies transform will 
show higher percentage. 
Liquidity dimension show the hospital ability to meet cash obligation in 
timely matter, this dimension is a little bit different with profitability dimension, we 
cannot said that high liquidity means better performance, if the liquidity is too high it 
can be indicated the hospital hold too much cash on hand or have a poor collection 
program for account receivable. CAH financial indicator for 2005 show average day’s 
cash on hand in US is 60 days. Using American standard as a benchmark writer 
expected days of Days Cash of Hand Indicator is increasing after the agencies 
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transform but it should not exceed 60 days. Net Days Revenue in Account Receivable 
Indicator show the agency’s ability to collect money, this indicator is predicted getting 
smaller because it assumed that after transform hospital management will getting 
better. 
Revenue Dimension could give us a clear picture about a composition source 
of revenue, but it could not show how good the managements are. We cannot argue 
that when outpatient revenue to total revenue indicator show a decreasing number its 
mean hospital management doing something bad. From the hospital perspective in 
Indonesia inpatient was more beneficial rather than outpatient, because most of the 
outpatient revenue goes to the doctor, so if the hospitals want to improve their source 
of revenue to fund their daily operation, they need to encourage inpatient service. It is 
predicted after they transform the indicator for outpatient to total revenue will 
decrease.  
Patient deduction indicator is predicted to decrease, because after they 
transform in to Public Service Agencies they will improve the service, so they can 
compete with private sector to provide service to non subsidy patient (VVIP and first 
class). 
Salaries to total expense indicator under cost dimension is predicted to be 
decrease. Salary is overhead cost, so when the volume of service is increasing the 
percentage salaries to total expense should be decrease. 
Number of patient is an indicator for improvement in service quality. If the 
hospitals provide better service more patients will come, transformation is expected 
will improve service quality, so it is predicted that number of patient for inpatient and 
outpatient will increase.  
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Table 2  
Summary of Testable Prediction 
 
Dimension and 
Indicator  
Proxies Predicted 
Relationship 
Profitability   
 Total margin Net income / total revenue TMA  > TMB 
 Cash flow margin ((Net income – (contribution, investment, and 
appropriation + depreciation expense + interest 
expense)) / (net patient revenue + other income - 
contribution, investment, and appropriation) 
CFMA > CFMB 
 Return on equity Net income / Equity ROEA > ROEB 
Liquidity   
 Days cash on hand (Cash + marketable securities + unrestricted 
investment)  / [(Total expense-depreciation) / 
Days in period] 
DCOHA > 
DCOHB 
Net days revenue in 
account receivable 
Net patient account receivable / (Net patient 
revenue / Days in period) 
DRARA < DRARB 
Revenue   
Outpatient revenues to 
total revenues 
Total outpatient revenue / Total patient revenue ORRA < ORRB 
Patient deductions (contractual allowance + discount) / Gross total 
patient revenue 
PDA < PDB 
Cost   
Salaries to total expense Salary expense / Total expense SEA < SEB 
Number of Patient   
Outpatient Number of outpatient growth OPA > OPB 
Inpatient Number of inpatient growth IPA > IPB 
Efficiency   
Bed Occupancy Rate 
(BOR) 
(Occupied bed days/(number of bed x days in one 
year)) x 100% 
BORA  > BORB 
Length of Stay (LOS) Occupied bed/ Inpatient discharge (include death) LOSA  > LOSB 
Turn Over Interval (TOI) ((number of bed x days in one year) – occupied 
bed days) / Inpatient discharge (include death) 
TOIA  < TOIB 
Bed Turn Over (BTO) Inpatient discharge (include death)/number of bed BTOA  > BTOB 
Outpatient to Doctor Ratio Number of outpatient/number of doctor ODRA  > ODRB 
Outpatient to Nurse Ratio Number of outpatient /number of nurse ONRA  > ONRB 
Inpatient to Doctor Ratio Number of inpatient/number of doctor IDRA  > IDRB 
Inpatient to Nurse Ratio Number of inpatient/number of nurse INRA  > INRB 
 
The function of efficiency analysis is to evaluate whether the hospital has 
been utilize its resources in an optimally way. Under assumption before 
transformation hospital usually provide poor services that cause people reluctant to go 
to government hospital, so the resources was assumed still underutilized. After 
transformation it is expected hospital will provides better service, it is predicted more 
people will come so two indicator bed occupancy rate (BOR) and bed turn over (BTO) 
will increase, people feel more comfortable in the hospital so average length of stay 
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(AvLOS) will increase. The increasing of patient on the other side will cause less time 
unoccupied bed so turn over interval (TOI) will decrease, and the increasing amount 
of patient will cause the workload of the doctor and nurse are also increase so the ratio 
Outpatient to doctor ratio, Outpatient to nurse ratio, Inpatient to doctor ratio, and 
Inpatient to nurse ratio is predicted will increase. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Data Collection Method 
This research used secondary data (financial report and performance report) 
from 13 Hospital that automatically transformed into Public Service Agency in June 
2005. Those hospitals are Cipto Mangunkusuma Hospital (RSCM), Fatmawati 
Hospital (RSF), Persahabatan Hospital (RSP), Harapan Kita Heart Hospital (RSJHK), 
Harapan Kita Children and Maternity Hospital (RSABHK), Dharmais Cancer 
Hospital (RSKD), Hasan Sadikin Hospital (RSHS), Doctor Kariadi Hospital (RSDK), 
Doctor Sardjito Hospital (RSDS), Sanglah Hospital (RSS), Wahidin Sudirohusodo 
Hospital (RSWS), Mohammad Djamil Hospital (RSMD), and Mohammad Hoesin 
Hospital (RSMH). Financial data was retrieved from yearly hospital financial report, 
while the data of the amount of patient and bed utilization was retrieved from hospital 
performance report. Both of the reports were gathered from Ministry of Health and 
some others were from Ministry of Finance. Before transformation, all hospitals had 
an obligation to send their financial report and performance report to Ministry of 
health; and after the transformation they had an additional task to send both 
documents to Ministry of Finance. 
The data used was from 2001 to 2009. The data within the period of 2001 to 
2004 was treated as pre- transformation data, while data within the period of 2006 to 
2009 was treated as post-transformation data. Data in 2005 was treated as year 0 and 
we removed it from the analysis because it contained both pre- and post- 
transformation data. 
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4.2 Data Analysis 
4.2.1 t-test 
To test the statistic significance of change from each indicator on each hospital, 
the statistical approach t-test with pooled variance was used. This method was 
choosen because it has been commonly used to evaluate the impact of reorganizations 
(Bilodeau et al, 2006) and it does not violated the assumption for t-test with pooled 
variance. It is showed by the fact that, both of the data pre- and post- transformations 
are independent, and the indicator evaluation, which was made on each hospital 
follows normal distribution, more over pre- and post- transformation data on each 
hospital, has equal standard deviation. 
To test the hypothesis of each indicator on table 1 to each hospital, the writer 
following the process that was done by Marthur and Banchuenvijit (2007) on 
evaluating the effect of privatization. First, all proxies from each hospital for 9 year 
period from 2001 – 2009 were calculated. Then, the mean value of pre-transformation 
(2001–2004) and post-transformation (2006–2009) data for all indicators from each 
hospital was calculated. Data in 2005 (Y=0) was excluded because it is a transitional 
period. After that, the value of the difference between pre- and post- transformation 
was determined. Finally, the significance of changes using t-test was calculated. 
T-test calculation was started with calculating the sample standard deviation 
pre- and post- transformation based on the proxies data on each hospital using 
formula: 
 
 
 
 
 
1



n
XX
s
- 28 - 
The second step after standard deviation was determined was calculating pooled 
variances using formula: 
 
 
The final step was calculating the t value using formula: 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a non parametric test that tests the significant level 
of the difference of two samples. This method was used because t-test for correlated 
sample cannot be legitimately applied to test overall significant changes. There are 
three assumptions that should be met if t-test is going to be used; first, both sample 
should have equal-interval scales, second the sample should be randomly picked from 
the population, and third, the difference should have a normal distribution (Lowry, 
2010). The third assumption could not be met because each hospital has different 
economic size. Their revenue is different due to facilities owned, so the difference 
could not have a normal distribution. 
Using the mean data that have been calculated on t-test, The Wilcoxon signed 
rank test started with finding the differences between pre- and post- transformation 
mean from each hospital. The sum of the mean from all the differences showed the 
impact of transformation. If the sum is positive, it signifies that transformation gives 
positive impact. However, if the sum is negative, it means that the transformation give 
negative impact. Nevertheless, the sum of the mean did not show the significant level 
of changes, so further calculations were needed.  
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After finding the difference between pre- and post- transformation for each 
hospital, next step was changing the value of the difference into absolute number 
simply by removing all negative signs. After that, the absolute value of the difference 
was ranked from the lowest to the highest. Finally, the same sign was given to the 
rank based on their original sign before becoming absolute value. The sum of the rank 
was symbolized as W, and the number of sample as N.  
Using the above data, the standard deviation and the value of Z was determined 
to test the significant level of the difference by using formula: 
 
 
In addition to Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test, a proportion test was also used to 
know whether there were more than 50% of the hospitals experiencing improvements 
in performance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5 EMPIRICAL RESULT 
 
The empirical result of the performance of 13 hospitals that have transformed 
into autonomous state agencies was presented from table 3 until 20 and discussed in 
this section 
5.1 Service Quality 
5.1.1 Profitability 
Hypothesis 1: Total Margin 
The result pertaining to total margin is shown in table 3. Six out of thirteen 
hospitals increased their total margin after the transformation (p = .61), but the 
increase was statistically significant only for three hospitals. The aggregate mean 
increase was statistically not significant (Z= .23). RSCM showed the greatest increase 
in revenue (around 13%), but the most significant improvement was RSDK (t = 6.59). 
The overall result was inconsistent with hypothesis 1. 
Total margin indicator measured the control of expense relative to revenue. 
Even though by transformation hospital could improve their revenue significantly 
(Monev BLU; 2010), most of them were still operating using traditional management 
system (non-computerized system). The weakness from this traditional system is that 
they could not detect fraud and leakage in operation. These two problems had caused 
high operating cost. So, no matter how much revenue was generates inefficiency 
would cause the margin remain low. 
Hypothesis 2: Cash Flow Margin 
The result pertaining Cash Flow Margin is shown in table 4. Six out of thirteen 
hospitals indicated the same movement with hypothesis (p = .61), and four of them 
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were statistically significant. The aggregate cash flow margin increase was 
statistically not significant (z= .23). RSHS increased cash flow margin with the 
highest percentage (around 17%), and RSS had the most significant improvement 
(t=2.84). The only hospital that showed positive cash flow margin was RSKD. Even 
though there were some improvements, the overall result was inconsistent with 
Hypothesis 2. 
Cash Flow Margin indicated the ability of hospital to generate cash flow from 
providing patient care service. It removed appropriation state budget from the revenue. 
It was expected that the transformations would make hospitals became more             
self-sufficient, so, it would reduce state budget burden. However, after transformation, 
the empirical analysis from the sample showed that there was no significant 
improvement in the mean of Cash Flow Margin. In average, the hospitals still need 
government subsidy for operational, which is around 23 %.  
Hypothesis 3: Return on Equity 
The empirical result for Return on Equity was not much different from the first 
two hypotheses. The result is shown in table 5. Six out of thirteen hospitals indicated 
an increase in return on equity (p = .61). Four of them were statistically significant 
with 5% significant level. The aggregate increasing in return on equity were 
statistically not significant (z = .43). RSCM had the biggest percentage increase 
(around 14%). Only four out of thirteen hospitals that have significant increase, so, it 
could be concluded that the empirical result was inconsistent with hypothesis 3. 
 This indicator measured the ability of hospital to generate net income by using 
equity that had been invested by the state government. The increase indicated a better 
performance from the hospital, but the empirical result showed unexpected result. 
This showed that the allocation of capital expenditure was not effective, so, it did not 
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give positive impact to the hospitals. 
5.1.2 Liquidity 
Hypothesis 4: Days Cash On Hand 
Days Cash on hand indicated the number of days hospital that could operate if 
no cash was collected or received. This indicator should not be too little or too much. 
If it is too small, the hospital will have problem in liquidity, and if it is too big, the 
hospital will have problem in idle asset. US Health Department mentioned that 60-70 
days cash on hand is considered to be appropriate. The empirical result shown in table 
6 showed that nine out of thirteen hospitals indicated the same movement as 
hypothesis (p = .08), and six of them were statistically significant. The aggregate 
showed insignificant increase (z = .856). After transformation two hospitals were in 
optimal condition, those are RSCM (64 days) and RSABHK (66 days). Overall results 
were consistent with hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 5: Net Days revenue in Account Receivable 
Net Days Revenue in Account receivable reflects the ability of the hospital to 
collect account receivable. US Health Department categorized the ability to collect 
account receivable in to three groups: first category is best practice which is around 
45-55 days, second category is average which is around 56-65 days, and third 
category is poor which is above 66 days. 
The empirical results shown in table 7 showed that six out of thirteen hospitals 
indicated a decreasing in net day’s revenue in account receivable (p = .61). Three of 
them were statistically significant with 5% significant level. The aggregate of Net 
days Revenue in Account Receivable showed an increasing value; the average of    
pre-transformation was 61 days, but post-transformation had an increase of 5 days, 
and turned into 66 days. RSABHK had the best account receivable management. On 
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average, they could collect receivable within 20 days. Based on US Health 
Department account receivable management categorization, three hospitals are 
categorized as best practice, four hospitals are as average, and six hospitals are as poor. 
It could be concluded that the result was inconsistent with hypothesis 5. 
The major contributor for the lengthened account receivable collection period is 
the health insurance for the poor (JAMKESMAS). In 2005, the government launched 
a program to provide free health service for the poor. This program uses 
reimbursement method that is after the poor receive health care, the hospital can ask 
for reimbursement to PT ASKES
12
. However, the hospital could not get the money as 
soon as possible, since PT ASKES needs to evaluate the bill and choose which service 
and medicine that could get reimbursement. This evaluation process takes a long time, 
between 9 months and 1 year. Before hospitals receive reimbursement, they treat it as 
account receivable. So, after the implementation of JAMKESMAS, the number of 
account receivable in hospital increased. 
5.1.3 Revenue 
Hypothesis 6: Out Patient Revenue to Total revenue 
The evaluation of outpatient revenue to total revenue is shown in table 8. There 
were only three out of thirteen hospitals that had a decreasing ratio (p = .97), and only 
one hospital that decreased with statistical significance. The overall result was 
opposite to hypothesis 6. This condition might indicate that people were still reluctant 
to obtain inpatient care service in government hospital. 
Hypothesis 7: Patient Deductions 
Patient deductions measure the allowance and discount from gross patient 
                                           
 
 
12 PT Askes choose by government to become Fund Manager for JAMKESMAS 
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revenue. In Indonesia, especially government hospital, allowance and discount are 
usually given to the poor. The Empirical result for patient deductions is shown in table 
9. Four out of thirteen hospitals showed a decrease in patient deductions ratio              
(p = .91), and one of them was statistically significant. The aggregate patient 
deductions increased and it was statistically significant with 5% significant level. The 
results were inconsistence with hypothesis 7. This indicated significant increase in 
subsidy from hospital. 
We expected that patient deduction would be smaller. Though the government 
hospital had been changed into autonomous state agency, it did not mean that they 
should reduce service to the poor. Even though the transformation was expected to 
change government agency to operate like private sector, as government agency, 
providing service to the poor is an obligation. They could not reject poor people only 
because they could not pay for the health care service. The major factor of increasing 
patient deductions is the different perception between hospital and PT Askes on 
service and medicine that could be reimbursed. Hospitals only focus on patient safety, 
so they took all necessary action to help the poor, while PT ASKES have their own 
criterion, that is not every service and medicine could get reimbursement. So, when 
hospitals try to reimburse the bill, PT ASKES usually only cover half of it, and the 
rest would become the burden of the hospital. 
5.1.4 Cost 
Hypothesis 8: Salaries to Total Expense 
The result pertaining ratio of salaries to total expense is shown in table 10. 
Seven out of thirteen hospitals showed a decrease in ratio (p = .39), and five of them 
was statistically significant. The aggregate decreasing in the ratio of Salaries to Total 
Expense was statistically insignificant (z = .15). The results were consistent with 
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hypothesis 8 but the change was not significant. 
5.1.5 Number of Patient 
Hypothesis 9: Number of outpatient growth 
The result pertaining the outpatient growth is shown in table 11. Ten out of 
thirteen hospitals showed an increasing number (p = .00), but only two of them 
increased with statistical significance. The aggregate number of outpatient growth 
showed significant increase at 1% significant level. The result was consistent with 
hypothesis 9. 
The positive impact of transformation could be caused by the change in 
payment method. In the old system
13
 the doctor could not receive their fee soon after 
they provided service. Sometimes it took 3-6 months to receive their fees. This 
complicated process caused the doctor always take the patient to his/her other medical 
practice
14
, where he can receive the fee instantly. After the hospital transformed into 
Public Service Agencies, they did not have the obligation to transfer the fee to 
treasury account, so the doctor could get their fee instantly. Consequently, there would 
be no reason for them to take the patient out of hospital.  
Hypothesis 10: Number of inpatient growth 
The result pertaining the inpatient growth is shown in table 12. Nine out of 
thirteen hospitals increased their inpatient number (p = .08), and three of them 
increased statistically significant. The aggregate increase is statistically significant at 
1% significant level. RSCM had the biggest increase in the number of inpatient 
                                           
 
 
13 In the old system, government agency use non tax revenue (PNBP) disbursement 
system, all the fee from service must be transfer to treasury account, and can be only 
withdrawal if already allocated in budget document. 
14 The doctor usually have practice in two or more different places. 
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growth. The overall result was consistent with hypothesis 10. 
The inpatient growth increased lower than outpatient growth. This condition 
was probably caused by poor facilities for inpatient in the hospital. Few of big 
hospitals in capital cities already have modernized equipment but most of government 
hospitals are still operating with old and obsolete equipment. This condition caused 
people to feel uncomfortable and doubtful when receiving inpatient service.  
 
5.2 Efficiency 
Hypothesis 11: Bed Occupancy Ratio (BOR) 
Bed Occupancy Ratio calculated the average number of inpatient beds which 
are occupied within a year. Ministry of Health mentioned ideal BOR value is around 
60-85%. It could not occupy more than 85%, because the bed needs to be cleaned up, 
to make sure it does not contain any infectious disease. On the other hand, if it is 
below 60%, it means the bed is underutilized. 
The result of analysis is presented on table 13. Nine out of thirteen hospitals 
indicated an increase in bed utilization (p = .08). Seven of them increased with 
statistically significant. The aggregate evaluation showed a significant improvement 
in BOR at 5% significant level. It increased 3.8% from 65.28% before transformation, 
into 69.11% after transformation. The result was consistent with hypothesis 11. 
 100 % hospitals were already in the optimal area. It could be concluded that 
they had already been at maximum capacity. If the hospitals want to continue the 
revenue growth, they should consider to improve their facilities in quantity and 
quality. 
Hypothesis 12: Average Length of Stay (AvLOS) 
Average Length of Stay indicates the average of one person receives inpatient 
treatment. Ministry of Health Indonesia stated that the ideal AvLOS is around 6-9 
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days. 
The empirical result is shown in table 14. Eleven out of thirteen hospitals had an 
increase in AvLOS indicator (p = .00), and nine of them is statistically significant. The 
aggregate indicated that average length of stay improved significantly with 5% 
significant level. It increased 1 day, from previous transformation 5 day to 6 day after 
transformation. Although there are fears after the transformation, the hospitals would 
cheat the patients by lengthening their stay in hospital. The concern was answered by 
the fact that the mean of AvLOS after transformation is still in an optimal area. The 
result was consistent with hypothesis 12. 
Hypothesis 13: Turn Over Interval (TOI) 
Turn over interval indicates the average day beds unoccupied from the last 
occupation to the next one. Ministry of Health of Indonesia mentioned that the ideal 
TOI is around 1 to 3 days. Table 15 presents the result of TOI analysis. Six out of 
thirteen hospitals decrease the interval (p = .60), and 5 of them was statistically 
significant. The aggregate TOI decreasing was statistically not significant (z = 0.68). 
The result was quite consistent with the hypothesis 13. 
Hypothesis 14: Bed Turn Over 
Bed Turn Over indicates frequency of use of a bed in one period, how 
many times beds are used in one year. Ministry of Health stated that the ideal BTO is 
around 40 to 50 times. Table 16 presents the data of BTO. Three out of thirteen 
hospitals increased the frequency, and all of them were statistically significant. The 
aggregate frequency of use after transformation was decreasing. This decrease was 
statistically significant at 5% significant level. The result was inconsistent with the 
hypothesis 14, but this decrease is still tolerable because the movement was still in 
optimal area (the mean of BTO after transformation is around 43 days).  
- 38 - 
Hypothesis 15: Outpatient – doctor to patient ratio 
Outpatient-patient to doctor ratio measures the average number of outpatients 
handled by doctor in one day. Table 17 represents the data of the ratio. All hospital 
indicated an increasing in outpatient doctor to patient ratio. The aggregate increase 
was significant at 1 % significant level. The result was consistent with hypothesis 15. 
Hypothesis 16: Outpatient – nurse to patient ratio 
Outpatient-patient to nurse ratio measures the average number of outpatients 
handled by nurse in one day. Table 18 presents the data analysis. Similar with 
previous ratio, all the hospitals indicated an increase in the ratio. The aggregate 
increase was significant at 1 % significant level. The mean of ratio increased 3 
persons, from 13 persons on previous transformation to 16 persons after 
transformation. The result was consistent with hypothesis 16. 
Hypothesis 17: Inpatient – doctor to patient ratio 
Inpatient-patient to doctor ratio measures the average number of inpatients 
handled by doctor in one day. Table 19 presents the data of the ratio. Unlike outpatient 
ratio, in this ratio there were only ten out of thirteen hospitals that could increase the 
ratio, and from that amount only four hospitals increase with statistical significance. 
The aggregate increase was significant at 1 % significant level. The mean of sample 
data increased 1 person from previously 8 persons to 9 persons. Even though the ratio 
did not increase as high as outpatient ratio, but the overall result was still consistent 
with hypothesis 17. 
Hypothesis 18: Inpatient – nurse to patient ratio 
Inpatient-patient to nurse ratio measures the average number of inpatients 
handled by nurse in one day. Table 20 presents the analysis of the data. Nine out of 
thirteen hospitals increased their inpatient to nurse ratio (p = .08). From that amount, 
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two hospital increased with statistical significance. The aggregate increase was 
statistically not significant. This condition might be caused by new additional of nurse 
did not consider patient growth. Reconsidering the small significance of the change, it 
is concluded that the result was inconsistent with the hypothesis. 
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Table 3  
Total Margin 
 
No Hospital 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean Statistic for Significant 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 9.02% 8.26% 3.75% 5.23% 0.55% 27.66% 22.18% 26.90% 4.30% 6.56% 20.26% 13.70% 2.45 0.02 
2 RSF 10.96% 8.59% 9.72% 3.04% 2.35% 10.08% 19.43% 13.25% 6.86% 8.08% 12.41% 4.33% 1.35 0.11 
3 RSP 9.52% 10.52% 14.61% 12.07% 7.50% 12.98% 11.65% 7.65% 0.51% 11.68% 8.20% -3.48% -1.15 0.15 
4 RSJHK 2.11% 3.98% 5.89% 4.12% 6.96% 15.06% 13.61% 4.41% 6.41% 4.03% 9.87% 5.85% 2.14 0.04 
5 RSABHK -0.52% 2.23% 3.39% 5.24% 4.36% 11.33% 8.12% -2.85% 19.74% 2.58% 9.08% 6.50% 1.35 0.11 
6 RSKD 3.85% 1.04% 5.88% 9.49% 14.34% 7.47% 7.40% 1.57% 6.32% 5.07% 5.69% 0.63% 0.28 0.40 
7 RSHS 7.71% 12.71% 18.67% 12.33% 6.66% 5.03% 2.53% -3.57% -3.78% 12.86% 0.05% -12.81% -4.06 0.00 
8 RSDK 4.87% 5.32% 6.48% 4.64% 3.21% 10.65% 12.99% 9.58% 10.31% 5.33% 10.88% 5.55% 6.59 0.00 
9 RSDS 0.59% 0.96% -0.87% -0.31% -0.44% 5.43% -6.70% -7.89% -14.85% 0.09% -6.00% -6.09% -1.44 0.10 
10 RSS 5.03% 4.36% 1.60% 2.82% 2.22% 2.00% 6.47% -1.78% 1.08% 3.45% 1.94% -1.51% -0.81 0.23 
11 RSWS 6.43% 6.40% 4.57% 1.98% 2.38% 2.03% 2.18% 1.52% 6.74% 4.84% 3.12% -1.73% -1.07 0.16 
12 RSMD 3.07% 1.53% 2.09% 2.17% -0.05% -4.57% 5.09% -5.40% -3.29% 2.21% -2.04% -4.25% -1.75 0.07 
13 RSMH 10.17% 8.54% 8.74% 9.42% 8.13% 7.85% 8.42% 7.31% 8.43% 9.22% 8.00% -1.22% -2.66 0.02 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 5.85% 6.27% 0.42% 0.23 0.41 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   46.15% -0.28 0.61 
 
Table 4  
Cash Flow Margin 
 
No Hospital 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean Statistic for Significant 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM -23.41% -19.84% -30.27% -31.55% -32.71% -22.38% -24.83% -23.23% -62.25% -26.27% -33.17% -6.90% -0.68 0.26 
2 RSF -13.84% -19.45% -20.71% -30.54% -36.59% -21.83% -22.53% -19.52% -27.61% -21.13% -22.87% -1.74% -0.45 0.33 
3 RSP -29.62% -27.05% -23.26% -29.94% -38.78% -32.41% -34.43% -29.57% -38.45% -27.47% -33.72% -6.25% -2.58 0.02 
4 RSJHK -0.45% 4.54% 3.08% 0.15% 6.12% 7.06% 6.88% 0.63% 1.95% 1.83% 4.13% 2.30% 1.12 0.15 
5 RSABHK -40.25% -35.31% -33.02% -29.89% -28.51% -19.17% -31.86% -41.22% -40.28% -34.62% -33.13% 1.49% 0.27 0.40 
6 RSKD -18.46% -22.91% -14.64% -12.25% -5.13% -7.02% -13.77% -11.68% -12.86% -17.07% -11.33% 5.73% 2.07 0.04 
7 RSHS -81.03% -34.47% -35.45% -41.20% -41.45% -26.15% -28.40% -31.05% -38.57% -48.04% -31.04% 17.00% 1.49 0.09 
8 RSDK -21.03% -24.46% -24.04% -29.98% -30.04% -17.12% -26.54% -18.95% -12.49% -24.88% -18.78% 6.10% 1.76 0.06 
9 RSDS -35.39% -31.41% -34.77% -33.35% -32.63% -23.95% -42.72% -29.04% -42.44% -33.73% -34.54% -0.81% -0.17 0.44 
10 RSS -50.85% -43.13% -46.21% -41.56% -40.61% -37.94% -29.29% -41.93% -34.22% -45.44% -35.84% 9.60% 2.84 0.01 
11 RSWS -8.26% -7.72% -9.98% -13.15% -12.65% -12.47% -12.39% -12.96% -5.95% -9.78% -10.94% -1.16% -0.56 0.30 
12 RSMD -13.26% -18.76% -17.91% -24.89% -18.45% -35.36% -33.73% -34.53% -38.07% -18.70% -35.42% -16.72% -6.50 0.00 
13 RSMH -7.74% -10.40% -9.37% -8.27% -9.28% -10.09% -9.24% -10.60% -9.17% -8.95% -9.78% -0.83% -1.21 0.14 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) -24.17% -23.57% 0.60% 0.23 0.41 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   46.15% -0.28 0.61 
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Table 5  
Return on Equity 
 
No Hospital 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean Statistic for Significant 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 10.99% 10.15% 4.92% 5.83% 0.63% 35.46% 24.65% 27.07% 2.15% 7.97% 22.33% 14.36% 1.97 0.05 
2 RSF 7.11% 5.84% 7.00% 2.08% 1.57% 7.94% 18.19% 12.07% 6.85% 5.51% 11.26% 5.76% 2.04 0.04 
3 RSP 11.63% 13.20% 19.95% 16.70% 10.66% 18.31% 16.62% 10.47% 0.79% 15.37% 11.55% -3.82% -0.87 0.21 
4 RSJHK 2.53% 4.81% 7.28% 5.01% 9.02% 19.94% 15.98% 5.15% 7.02% 4.91% 12.02% 7.12% 1.94 0.05 
5 RSABHK -0.57% 2.49% 3.84% 5.98% 4.94% 12.82% 9.80% -3.51% 4.06% 2.93% 5.79% 2.86% 0.74 0.24 
6 RSKD 2.31% 0.63% 4.02% 6.53% 10.68% 6.35% 7.42% 1.73% 7.77% 3.37% 5.82% 2.44% 1.30 0.12 
7 RSHS 1.56% 2.89% 6.79% 4.65% 3.10% 2.86% 1.92% -2.96% -4.07% 3.97% -0.56% -4.54% -2.19 0.04 
8 RSDK 2.16% 2.54% 3.30% 2.41% 1.76% 6.77% 8.69% 6.78% 3.20% 2.60% 6.36% 3.75% 3.20 0.01 
9 RSDS 0.25% 0.43% -0.40% -0.14% -0.22% 2.73% -3.93% -5.33% -25.36% 0.03% -7.97% -8.01% -1.32 0.12 
10 RSS 5.77% 5.28% 1.92% 3.44% 2.69% 2.50% 8.29% -2.34% 1.51% 4.10% 2.49% -1.61% -0.68 0.26 
11 RSWS 4.16% 4.17% 3.02% 1.31% 1.57% 1.40% 1.49% 1.05% 4.75% 3.16% 2.17% -0.99% -0.91 0.20 
12 RSMD 1.65% 0.86% 0.94% 1.03% -0.02% -2.15% 3.56% -3.49% -2.26% 1.12% -1.08% -2.20% -1.39 0.11 
13 RSMH 8.38% 6.92% 7.12% 7.84% 6.75% 6.48% 7.05% 6.12% 7.22% 7.56% 6.72% -0.84% -2.01 0.05 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 4.82% 5.92% 1.10% 0.44 0.33 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   46.15% -0.28 0.61 
 
Table 6  
Days Cash on Hand 
 
No Hospital 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean Statistic for Significant 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 134.73 137.59 99.48 109.44 100.25 116.09 41.44 43.20 58.27 120.31 64.75 -55.56 -2.79 0.02 
2 RSF 29.39 24.05 28.43 37.20 33.31 41.58 19.15 46.90 45.20 29.77 38.21 8.44 1.21 0.14 
3 RSP 40.44 47.70 54.27 59.29 45.27 60.55 25.93 27.22 46.93 50.42 40.16 -10.27 -1.11 0.16 
4 RSJHK 79.96 67.08 71.40 80.96 70.91 78.46 144.98 121.25 129.22 74.85 118.48 43.63 2.99 0.01 
5 RSABHK 26.04 18.88 20.93 26.21 15.77 53.49 66.48 67.67 76.44 23.01 66.02 43.01 8.47 0.00 
6 RSKD 22.27 25.63 31.16 29.00 29.54 21.32 20.06 30.61 44.55 27.02 29.14 2.12 0.35 0.37 
7 RSHS 58.95 59.46 43.51 47.58 26.27 31.87 36.06 18.65 9.09 52.37 23.92 -28.46 -3.86 0.00 
8 RSDK 56.53 46.73 54.92 60.13 42.28 66.34 108.74 140.40 167.66 54.58 120.79 66.21 3.01 0.01 
9 RSDS 40.02 40.67 44.65 40.14 41.20 46.25 55.71 50.85 53.17 41.37 51.50 10.13 4.42 0.00 
10 RSS 42.26 30.45 29.70 30.83 42.86 33.89 21.64 67.64 33.61 33.31 39.20 5.89 0.57 0.29 
11 RSWS 15.28 11.16 6.76 14.70 9.50 12.41 15.86 17.26 14.96 11.97 15.12 3.15 1.42 0.10 
12 RSMD 15.44 16.42 16.97 19.10 15.21 19.75 10.16 12.75 10.44 16.99 13.27 -3.71 -1.57 0.08 
13 RSMH 8.00 9.16 10.31 11.62 6.89 11.42 10.18 14.95 12.18 9.77 12.18 2.41 1.89 0.05 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 41.98 48.67 6.69 0.86 0.19 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   69.23% 1.39 0.08 
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Table 7  
Net Days Revenue in Account Receivable 
 
No Hospital 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean Statistic for Significant 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 40.66 42.69 55.60 55.36 60.73 60.37 90.62 140.13 68.46 48.58 89.89 41.32 2.25 0.03 
2 RSF 45.62 37.78 37.61 49.72 47.96 42.98 62.45 65.81 63.51 42.68 58.69 16.01 2.64 0.02 
3 RSP 42.69 42.43 38.99 39.81 38.80 39.50 85.54 103.15 65.15 40.98 73.34 32.36 2.36 0.03 
4 RSJHK 51.75 67.53 69.60 80.02 65.90 72.45 60.30 73.28 47.27 67.22 63.33 -3.90 -0.46 0.33 
5 RSABHK 25.22 24.56 23.97 21.31 21.71 18.64 22.33 21.43 19.85 23.76 20.56 -3.20 -2.69 0.02 
6 RSKD 49.18 51.23 47.04 53.93 41.74 54.42 57.86 62.04 49.56 50.35 55.97 5.62 1.86 0.06 
7 RSHS 63.65 56.89 53.87 66.33 64.52 87.15 75.82 86.17 48.67 60.18 74.45 14.27 1.51 0.09 
8 RSDK 56.02 54.98 59.44 53.32 53.61 56.78 51.37 46.83 45.72 55.94 50.18 -5.76 -2.04 0.04 
9 RSDS 81.50 81.79 75.44 81.77 80.24 78.15 63.63 57.92 39.72 80.12 59.85 -20.27 -2.50 0.02 
10 RSS 99.23 102.06 84.86 85.08 95.41 98.80 103.12 66.45 68.00 92.81 84.09 -8.72 -0.81 0.23 
11 RSWS 38.86 46.98 50.01 51.19 47.90 51.74 50.36 55.23 56.49 46.76 53.45 6.69 2.14 0.04 
12 RSMD 121.68 125.87 110.85 115.46 115.16 134.34 99.83 103.94 99.59 118.47 109.42 -9.04 -1.00 0.18 
13 RSMH 59.28 65.85 67.29 71.71 61.63 68.22 72.55 76.84 67.14 66.03 71.19 5.16 1.52 0.09 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 61.07 66.49 5.43 0.79 0.21 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   46.15% -0.28 0.61 
 
Table 8  
Outpatient Revenue to Total Revenue 
 
No Hospital 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean Statistic for Significant 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 60.13% 57.70% 49.24% 51.63% 51.19% 44.38% 25.32% 22.98% 20.93% 54.68% 28.40% -26.27% -4.40 0.00 
2 RSF 10.21% 15.28% 17.10% 17.50% 21.33% 18.69% 23.31% 23.76% 24.92% 15.02% 22.67% 7.65% 3.53 0.01 
3 RSP 6.68% 7.75% 6.57% 5.35% 5.65% 4.28% 4.47% 6.08% 34.74% 6.59% 12.39% 5.81% 0.78 0.23 
4 RSJHK 3.24% 3.22% 3.37% 3.60% 3.56% 5.32% 5.61% 5.46% 7.71% 3.36% 6.02% 2.67% 4.68 0.00 
5 RSABHK 26.72% 27.81% 29.59% 28.81% 30.32% 27.81% 25.45% 27.43% 32.54% 28.23% 28.31% 0.08% 0.05 0.48 
6 RSKD 14.92% 15.28% 13.96% 14.03% 12.87% 11.67% 14.86% 14.97% 14.25% 14.55% 13.94% -0.61% -0.73 0.25 
7 RSHS 3.55% 5.62% 6.89% 7.03% 13.50% 12.00% 11.98% 12.31% 11.71% 5.77% 12.00% 6.23% 7.63 0.00 
8 RSDK 5.99% 5.80% 5.92% 6.35% 5.50% 4.98% 4.54% 3.79% 5.38% 6.02% 4.67% -1.34% -3.72 0.00 
9 RSDS 10.46% 9.92% 9.70% 9.88% 9.74% 9.51% 11.30% 10.24% 9.51% 9.99% 10.14% 0.15% 0.34 0.37 
10 RSS 8.22% 7.71% 7.68% 7.57% 7.61% 7.54% 7.46% 8.79% 8.15% 7.80% 7.98% 0.19% 0.54 0.30 
11 RSWS 9.52% 9.81% 9.83% 9.32% 10.62% 10.66% 10.34% 11.39% 11.76% 9.62% 11.04% 1.42% 4.10 0.00 
12 RSMD 5.00% 4.51% 4.66% 5.88% 4.78% 4.74% 6.89% 7.49% 8.25% 5.01% 6.84% 1.83% 2.25 0.03 
13 RSMH 3.92% 4.13% 4.38% 4.77% 4.17% 5.12% 5.42% 5.72% 6.24% 4.30% 5.63% 1.32% 4.41 0.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 13.15% 13.08% -0.07% 1.55 0.06 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   23.08% -1.94 0.97 
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Table 9  
Patient Deduction 
 
No Hospital 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean Statistic for Significant 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 0.33% 0.32% 0.43% 0.33% 0.30% 4.34% 4.10% 1.14% 0.98% 0.35% 2.64% 2.29% 2.50 0.02 
2 RSF 11.05% 13.07% 13.17% 17.43% 14.47% 12.49% 16.08% 12.78% 11.64% 13.68% 13.25% -0.43% -0.26 0.40 
3 RSP 5.93% 6.39% 6.83% 6.91% 7.20% 10.17% 12.45% 8.56% 10.61% 6.51% 10.45% 3.94% 4.74 0.00 
4 RSJHK 2.20% 1.79% 2.44% 3.04% 1.83% 4.31% 2.81% 1.18% 4.80% 2.37% 3.28% 0.91% 1.06 0.16 
5 RSABHK 1.99% 1.98% 2.14% 2.42% 2.04% 2.00% 3.05% 2.58% 2.59% 2.13% 2.55% 0.42% 1.75 0.07 
6 RSKD 2.11% 2.35% 2.17% 3.62% 1.53% 7.20% 9.03% 6.74% 6.80% 2.56% 7.44% 4.88% 7.54 0.00 
7 RSHS 29.27% 20.12% 14.24% 12.70% 10.54% 8.59% 6.75% 6.87% 6.57% 19.08% 7.19% -11.89% -3.14 0.01 
8 RSDK 7.16% 7.37% 7.23% 7.68% 6.73% 13.00% 18.73% 10.52% 9.43% 7.36% 12.92% 5.56% 2.67 0.02 
9 RSDS 5.66% 4.14% 6.29% 5.67% 6.01% 5.87% 8.88% 3.58% 2.63% 5.44% 5.24% -0.20% -0.14 0.45 
10 RSS 3.96% 4.00% 3.55% 3.83% 3.94% 4.18% 3.83% 3.66% 3.38% 3.83% 3.76% -0.07% -0.37 0.36 
11 RSWS 4.23% 4.53% 4.21% 3.37% 4.68% 4.80% 5.16% 5.50% 4.84% 4.08% 5.07% 0.99% 3.33 0.01 
12 RSMD 5.03% 5.47% 5.99% 7.75% 6.25% 4.52% 12.35% 10.47% 8.43% 6.06% 8.94% 2.88% 1.62 0.08 
13 RSMH 2.44% 3.13% 3.03% 2.44% 3.39% 3.86% 3.93% 4.53% 3.71% 2.76% 4.01% 1.25% 4.86 0.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 5.86% 6.67% 0.81% 1.76 0.04 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   30.77% -1.39 0.92 
 
Table 10  
Salaries to Total Expense 
 
No Hospital 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean Statistic for Significant 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 66.25% 59.88% 56.59% 55.64% 55.12% 57.81% 52.63% 50.26% 30.10% 59.59% 47.70% -11.89% -1.82 0.06 
2 RSF 53.07% 53.86% 52.81% 54.07% 57.84% 58.24% 57.85% 58.18% 54.66% 53.45% 57.23% 3.78% 4.13 0.00 
3 RSP 55.60% 55.69% 56.05% 54.83% 55.45% 57.58% 56.32% 57.56% 58.03% 55.54% 57.37% 1.83% 4.09 0.00 
4 RSJHK 34.00% 35.62% 35.44% 36.75% 36.34% 35.21% 36.93% 39.94% 35.22% 35.45% 36.83% 1.38% 1.10 0.16 
5 RSABHK 67.38% 66.10% 65.74% 64.99% 64.52% 61.56% 66.28% 66.38% 60.84% 66.05% 63.76% -2.29% -1.46 0.10 
6 RSKD 25.13% 24.31% 25.79% 26.54% 26.98% 24.07% 25.54% 25.50% 26.50% 25.44% 25.40% -0.04% -0.05 0.48 
7 RSHS 50.22% 61.11% 63.78% 61.74% 61.99% 53.49% 45.90% 52.40% 48.40% 59.21% 50.05% -9.17% -2.60 0.02 
8 RSDK 39.93% 42.89% 43.27% 43.17% 43.12% 45.47% 48.66% 40.55% 47.93% 42.31% 45.65% 3.34% 1.67 0.07 
9 RSDS 48.84% 47.78% 47.29% 46.46% 46.76% 49.41% 42.16% 47.64% 47.44% 47.59% 46.66% -0.93% -0.57 0.30 
10 RSS 24.45% 22.92% 23.58% 24.61% 25.15% 25.54% 26.80% 28.88% 29.96% 23.89% 27.79% 3.90% 3.63 0.01 
11 RSWS 53.73% 53.28% 51.81% 50.64% 51.40% 49.40% 49.95% 49.30% 51.86% 52.37% 50.13% -2.24% -2.42 0.03 
12 RSMD 18.53% 19.48% 20.11% 20.80% 21.89% 23.10% 29.31% 31.19% 32.90% 19.73% 29.12% 9.39% 4.28 0.00 
13 RSMH 40.11% 40.00% 39.89% 39.81% 39.30% 39.63% 39.70% 39.47% 39.71% 39.95% 39.63% -0.33% -3.81 0.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 44.66% 44.41% -0.25% 0.16 0.44 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   53.85% 0.28 0.39 
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Table 11  
Out Patient Growth 
 
No Hospital 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean Statistic for Significant 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 0.84 1.16 0.91 1.15 1.03 1.02 0.74 1.07 1.23 1.02 1.02 0.00 0.00 0.50 
2 RSF 1.23 1.39 1.20 1.04 1.16 1.09 1.36 1.19 1.20 1.22 1.21 -0.01 -0.06 0.48 
3 RSP 1.05 1.27 0.96 0.88 1.11 0.93 1.27 0.95 1.60 1.04 1.19 0.15 0.82 0.22 
4 RSJHK 1.04 1.09 1.07 1.09 1.11 1.40 1.09 1.04 1.07 1.07 1.15 0.08 0.91 0.20 
5 RSABHK 1.07 1.12 1.11 1.03 1.07 1.04 1.02 1.08 1.21 1.08 1.09 0.00 0.11 0.46 
6 RSKD 1.06 1.07 1.05 1.08 1.02 1.11 1.35 1.21 1.23 1.07 1.23 0.16 3.22 0.01 
7 RSHS 1.08 1.36 1.37 1.07 1.40 1.25 1.33 1.34 1.18 1.22 1.28 0.05 0.60 0.29 
8 RSDK 1.02 1.04 1.09 1.10 0.92 1.22 1.00 1.00 1.83 1.06 1.26 0.20 1.01 0.17 
9 RSDS 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.07 1.07 1.03 1.26 1.04 1.08 1.03 1.10 0.07 1.27 0.13 
10 RSS 1.02 1.09 1.03 1.05 1.04 1.06 1.04 1.20 1.02 1.05 1.08 0.03 0.74 0.24 
11 RSWS 1.03 1.05 1.01 0.95 1.14 1.06 0.97 1.11 1.05 1.01 1.05 0.04 1.04 0.17 
12 RSMD 0.99 0.93 1.15 1.28 0.91 0.89 1.19 1.09 1.11 1.09 1.07 -0.02 -0.17 0.43 
13 RSMH 1.03 1.04 1.08 1.11 0.89 1.22 1.07 1.18 1.12 1.07 1.15 0.08 2.18 0.04 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 1.08 1.14 0.06 2.69 0.00 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   83.33% 2.40 0.01 
 
Table 12  
Inpatient Growth 
 
No Hospital 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean Statistic for Significant 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 1.02 1.03 1.26 0.93 1.02 1.40 1.48 1.15 1.30 1.06 1.33 0.27 2.72 0.02 
2 RSF 1.03 1.04 1.11 1.09 0.90 1.03 1.16 1.07 1.00 1.07 1.07 0.00 -0.06 0.48 
3 RSP 1.02 1.08 1.14 1.05 1.01 1.11 1.20 0.92 1.35 1.07 1.15 0.07 0.78 0.23 
4 RSJHK 1.02 1.11 1.11 1.12 1.14 1.20 1.03 1.05 1.05 1.09 1.08 -0.01 -0.16 0.44 
5 RSABHK 1.02 1.06 1.06 1.04 1.05 1.15 1.31 0.94 1.45 1.05 1.21 0.17 1.52 0.09 
6 RSKD 1.02 1.13 1.04 1.08 1.02 1.26 1.01 1.00 1.13 1.07 1.10 0.03 0.50 0.32 
7 RSHS 1.04 1.37 1.21 1.01 1.25 1.28 1.28 1.24 1.18 1.16 1.25 0.09 1.01 0.18 
8 RSDK 1.03 1.13 1.05 1.14 1.13 1.26 1.10 1.01 1.20 1.09 1.14 0.06 0.89 0.20 
9 RSDS 1.02 1.10 1.15 1.13 1.08 1.09 1.11 1.11 1.46 1.10 1.19 0.09 0.99 0.18 
10 RSS 1.06 1.02 1.02 1.03 0.99 1.06 1.04 1.13 1.04 1.03 1.07 0.03 1.50 0.09 
11 RSWS 1.01 0.98 1.10 0.99 1.03 1.02 0.99 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.01 -0.01 -0.35 0.37 
12 RSMD 1.00 1.12 0.98 0.97 1.14 1.03 1.37 0.98 1.07 1.02 1.11 0.10 1.01 0.18 
13 RSMH 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.08 0.96 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.03 -0.01 -0.87 0.21 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 1.07 1.13 0.07 2.46 0.01 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   69.23% 1.39 0.08 
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Table 13  
Bed Occupancy Ratio (BOR) 
 
No Hospital 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean Statistic for Significant 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 56% 53% 58% 49% 46% 50% 67% 60% 71% 54% 62% 8% 1.59 0.08 
2 RSF 76% 74% 77% 79% 67% 65% 72% 73% 70% 76% 70% -6% -3.02 0.01 
3 RSP 56% 55% 52% 52% 46% 55% 57% 61% 64% 54% 59% 6% 2.46 0.02 
4 RSJHK 72% 68% 69% 72% 69% 69% 68% 73% 69% 70% 69% -1% -0.64 0.27 
5 RSABHK 66% 68% 69% 67% 67% 68% 72% 64% 74% 68% 69% 2% 0.83 0.22 
6 RSKD 56% 59% 58% 59% 60% 69% 67% 66% 68% 58% 68% 10% 9.49 0.00 
7 RSHS 57% 64% 61% 61% 75% 80% 73% 73% 72% 61% 74% 14% 5.75 0.00 
8 RSDK 66% 67% 65% 64% 59% 65% 68% 66% 75% 66% 69% 3% 1.26 0.13 
9 RSDS 59% 61% 60% 60% 50% 51% 54% 57% 80% 60% 61% 1% 0.09 0.47 
10 RSS 60% 59% 60% 61% 59% 62% 64% 72% 74% 60% 68% 8% 2.77 0.02 
11 RSWS 83% 76% 80% 74% 73% 71% 80% 82% 75% 78% 77% -1% -0.45 0.34 
12 RSMD 65% 66% 67% 72% 72% 75% 78% 75% 79% 67% 77% 9% 5.14 0.00 
13 RSMH 79% 76% 75% 77% 77% 74% 75% 78% 75% 77% 75% -1% -1.01 0.18 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 65.29% 69.11% 3.82% 1.97 0.02 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   69.23% 1.39 0.08 
 
Table 14  
Average Length of Stay (AvLOS) 
 
No Hospital 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean Statistic for Significant 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 3.24 3.09 3.51 2.98 2.80 3.50 5.10 5.71 7.62 3.21 5.48 2.27 2.65 0.02 
2 RSF 15.26 15.16 15.91 15.01 6.25 5.84 7.95 8.91 6.36 15.33 7.27 -8.07 -10.98 0.00 
3 RSP 6.05 5.93 5.51 5.93 5.63 6.98 6.91 6.64 6.63 5.85 6.79 0.94 6.30 0.00 
4 RSJHK 7.09 6.81 7.00 7.73 7.76 7.93 6.56 7.36 7.10 7.16 7.24 0.08 0.23 0.41 
5 RSABHK 4.31 4.76 5.17 5.34 5.65 6.06 6.68 6.28 9.47 4.89 7.12 2.23 2.70 0.02 
6 RSKD 9.26 9.58 9.37 9.57 9.60 10.00 10.00 9.00 14.00 9.45 10.75 1.30 1.17 0.14 
7 RSHS 7.00 8.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 7.04 7.00 6.92 7.50 7.24 -0.26 -0.68 0.26 
8 RSDK 2.66 2.91 3.01 3.16 3.09 3.58 3.94 3.98 4.78 2.94 4.07 1.14 4.17 0.00 
9 RSDS 2.40 2.65 2.76 2.96 2.59 2.82 3.13 3.48 5.08 2.69 3.63 0.93 1.82 0.06 
10 RSS 4.27 4.35 4.43 4.55 4.52 4.79 4.97 5.63 5.72 4.40 5.28 0.88 3.68 0.01 
11 RSWS 3.38 3.29 3.70 3.66 3.79 3.88 4.64 4.97 4.78 3.51 4.57 1.06 4.09 0.00 
12 RSMD 5.29 5.48 5.64 6.11 6.19 6.53 6.96 6.82 7.30 5.63 6.90 1.27 5.39 0.00 
13 RSMH 3.40 3.53 3.66 4.02 4.21 4.28 6.00 6.00 4.99 3.65 5.32 1.66 3.77 0.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 5.86 6.28 0.42 2.11 0.02 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   84.62% 2.50 0.01 
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Table 15  
Turn Over Interval (TOI) 
 
No HOSPITAL 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
MEAN TEST OF STATISTIC 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 2.56 2.72 2.53 3.07 3.33 3.47 2.54 3.83 3.16 2.72 3.25 0.53 1.77 0.06 
2 RSF 4.79 5.36 4.79 4.03 3.07 3.09 3.08 3.22 2.71 4.74 3.03 -1.72 -5.80 0.00 
3 RSP 4.71 4.90 5.07 5.56 6.69 5.76 5.12 3.76 3.71 5.06 4.59 -0.47 -0.87 0.21 
4 RSJHK 2.79 3.14 3.14 2.98 3.41 3.60 3.11 2.77 3.29 3.01 3.19 0.18 0.94 0.19 
5 RSABHK 2.23 2.24 2.30 2.59 2.75 2.80 2.65 3.52 3.36 2.34 3.08 0.74 3.28 0.01 
6 RSKD 7.39 6.68 6.88 6.70 6.00 4.90 4.90 4.00 5.00 6.91 4.70 -2.21 -7.73 0.00 
7 RSHS 6.07 4.58 4.70 4.83 2.68 2.41 2.60 2.51 2.72 5.05 2.56 -2.48 -7.06 0.00 
8 RSDK 1.38 1.43 1.61 1.75 2.12 1.91 1.84 2.09 1.58 1.54 1.85 0.31 2.27 0.03 
9 RSDS 1.65 1.69 1.86 1.95 2.61 2.67 2.65 2.59 1.28 1.79 2.30 0.51 1.47 0.10 
10 RSS 2.82 2.96 2.95 2.97 3.10 2.91 2.79 1.77 2.03 2.92 2.38 -0.55 -1.94 0.05 
11 RSWS 0.67 1.04 0.92 1.26 1.41 1.61 1.14 1.10 1.58 0.97 1.36 0.38 2.09 0.04 
12 RSMD 2.89 2.82 2.77 2.41 2.44 2.21 1.89 2.25 1.99 2.72 2.08 -0.64 -4.64 0.00 
13 RSMH 0.93 1.09 1.25 1.18 1.28 1.50 2.03 2.00 1.66 1.12 1.80 0.68 4.66 0.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 3.15 2.78 -0.36 -0.68 0.26 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   46.15% -0.28 0.61 
 
Table 16  
Bed Turn Over (BTO) 
 
No HOSPITAL 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
MEAN TEST OF STATISTIC 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 62.14 61.92 59.63 59.44 58.67 51.68 47.12 37.73 33.41 60.78 42.49 -18.30 -4.30 0.00 
2 RSF 17.96 17.54 17.39 18.91 38.62 40.28 32.62 29.69 40.26 17.95 35.71 17.76 6.53 0.00 
3 RSP 33.47 33.26 34.02 31.34 29.23 28.26 29.93 37.84 34.81 33.02 32.71 -0.32 -0.14 0.45 
4 RSJHK 36.45 36.18 35.48 33.63 32.24 31.23 37.22 34.93 36.13 35.44 34.88 -0.56 -0.39 0.36 
5 RSABHK 55.11 51.43 48.22 45.38 42.86 40.61 38.58 36.74 28.07 50.04 36.00 -14.04 -4.05 0.00 
6 RSKD 21.63 22.13 22.15 22.12 22.50 23.00 28.70 29.00 21.00 22.01 25.43 3.42 1.69 0.07 
7 RSHS 26.00 29.00 30.00 29.00 34.00 34.00 37.35 40.00 37.35 28.50 37.17 8.67 5.77 0.00 
8 RSDK 88.97 83.04 77.85 73.27 69.20 65.56 62.28 59.31 56.62 80.78 60.94 -19.84 -5.10 0.00 
9 RSDS 88.97 83.04 77.85 73.27 69.20 65.56 62.28 59.31 56.62 80.78 60.94 -19.84 -5.10 0.00 
10 RSS 50.83 49.27 48.82 47.92 47.24 46.73 46.36 46.45 46.45 49.21 46.50 -2.71 -4.41 0.00 
11 RSWS 88.97 83.04 77.85 73.27 69.20 65.56 62.28 59.31 56.62 80.78 60.94 -19.84 -5.10 0.00 
12 RSMD 43.98 43.40 42.83 42.27 41.73 41.20 40.69 39.69 38.75 43.12 40.08 -3.04 -4.63 0.00 
13 RSMH 83.04 77.85 73.27 69.20 65.56 62.28 44.83 47.00 54.16 75.84 52.07 -23.77 -4.81 0.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 50.63 43.53 -7.11 -1.87 0.03 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   23.08% -1.94 0.97 
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Table 17  
Outpatient – Doctor to Patient Ratio 
 
No HOSPITAL 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
MEAN TEST OF STATISTIC 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 19.20 22.20 21.80 23.40 23.80 23.82 21.60 22.90 24.09 21.65 23.10 1.45 1.39 0.11 
2 RSF 17.01 16.20 19.80 17.01 14.50 18.30 16.20 17.01 19.80 17.51 17.83 0.32 0.29 0.39 
3 RSP 19.30 19.80 19.80 19.60 20.50 19.70 19.60 21.00 22.30 19.63 20.65 1.03 1.59 0.08 
4 RSJHK 12.80 14.50 13.20 13.20 14.50 22.82 24.03 25.42 28.47 13.43 25.19 11.76 9.24 0.00 
5 RSABHK 18.30 17.90 18.50 19.00 18.30 19.30 19.00 19.60 19.80 18.43 19.43 1.00 3.47 0.01 
6 RSKD 4.10 5.10 4.90 3.60 3.78 3.80 7.30 7.30 9.00 4.43 6.85 2.43 2.11 0.04 
7 RSHS 19.80 21.80 22.40 24.30 29.60 28.30 29.20 29.32 29.40 22.08 29.06 6.98 7.26 0.00 
8 RSDK 4.90 5.10 3.78 4.90 7.30 3.78 7.30 9.00 9.80 4.67 7.47 2.80 2.04 0.04 
9 RSDS 9.80 9.00 14.50 9.80 13.20 12.80 14.50 13.20 22.82 10.78 15.83 5.06 1.89 0.05 
10 RSS 3.78 4.90 5.10 4.90 3.78 7.30 7.00 6.22 7.00 4.67 6.88 2.21 5.83 0.00 
11 RSWS 19.40 18.90 19.60 19.40 19.80 19.60 22.40 19.80 21.80 19.33 20.90 1.58 2.19 0.04 
12 RSMD 4.90 4.90 3.78 5.10 4.90 3.78 7.30 6.20 5.10 4.67 5.60 0.93 1.14 0.15 
13 RSMH 10.80 10.20 11.00 10.20 11.00 10.00 11.70 12.00 12.40 10.55 11.53 0.98 1.72 0.07 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 13.21 16.18 2.96 3.16 0.00 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   100.00% 3.61 0.00 
 
Table 18  
Outpatient – Nurse to Patient Ratio 
 
No HOSPITAL 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
MEAN TEST OF STATISTIC 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 19.20 22.20 21.80 23.40 23.80 23.82 21.60 22.90 24.09 21.65 23.10 1.45 1.39 0.11 
2 RSF 17.01 16.20 19.80 17.01 14.50 18.30 16.20 17.01 19.80 17.51 17.83 0.32 0.29 0.39 
3 RSP 19.30 19.80 19.80 19.60 20.50 19.70 19.60 24.00 22.30 19.63 21.40 1.78 1.65 0.07 
4 RSJHK 12.80 14.50 13.20 13.20 14.50 22.82 24.03 25.42 28.47 13.43 25.19 11.76 9.24 0.00 
5 RSABHK 18.30 17.90 18.50 19.00 18.30 19.30 19.00 19.60 19.80 18.43 19.43 1.00 3.47 0.01 
6 RSKD 4.10 5.10 4.90 3.60 3.78 6.70 13.10 2.00 26.00 4.43 11.95 7.53 1.44 0.10 
7 RSHS 19.80 21.80 22.40 24.30 29.60 28.30 29.20 22.90 29.40 22.08 27.45 5.38 3.00 0.01 
8 RSDK 4.90 5.10 3.78 4.90 7.30 3.78 7.30 9.00 9.80 4.67 7.47 2.80 2.04 0.04 
9 RSDS 9.80 9.00 14.50 9.80 13.20 12.80 14.50 13.20 22.82 10.78 15.83 5.06 1.89 0.05 
10 RSS 3.78 4.90 5.10 4.90 3.78 7.30 7.00 6.22 7.00 4.67 6.88 2.21 5.83 0.00 
11 RSWS 19.40 18.90 19.60 19.40 19.80 19.60 22.40 19.80 21.80 19.33 20.90 1.58 2.19 0.04 
12 RSMD 4.90 4.90 3.78 5.10 4.90 3.78 7.30 6.20 5.10 4.67 5.60 0.93 1.14 0.15 
13 RSMH 10.80 10.20 11.00 10.20 11.00 10.00 11.70 14.00 12.40 10.55 12.03 1.48 1.73 0.07 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 13.21 16.54 3.33 3.16 0.00 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   100.00% 3.61 0.00 
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Table 19  
Inpatient – Doctor to Patient Ratio 
 
No HOSPITAL 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
MEAN TEST OF STATISTIC 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 28.20 29.50 32.40 31.20 33.40 32.50 30.80 34.70 35.00 30.33 33.25 2.93 2.16 0.04 
2 RSF 28.20 26.50 27.20 27.30 27.40 27.75 25.80 27.75 27.20 27.30 27.13 -0.18 -0.30 0.39 
3 RSP 3.20 3.60 3.10 4.00 3.20 3.80 4.20 4.00 4.60 3.48 4.15 0.68 2.53 0.02 
4 RSJHK 26.90 27.20 28.20 26.50 25.80 27.20 26.80 30.29 27.75 27.20 28.01 0.81 0.94 0.19 
5 RSABHK 3.20 2.80 3.10 4.00 3.20 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.60 3.28 3.65 0.38 0.80 0.23 
6 RSKD 2.50 3.00 3.20 2.80 3.10 4.00 3.00 2.90 3.00 2.88 3.23 0.35 1.17 0.14 
7 RSHS 2.70 3.00 3.00 2.80 3.00 3.80 3.20 4.11 5.20 2.88 4.08 1.20 2.82 0.02 
8 RSDK 3.20 3.00 2.80 3.20 3.20 2.80 2.80 3.10 3.20 3.05 2.98 -0.08 -0.53 0.31 
9 RSDS 3.00 2.80 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.20 3.20 3.00 2.80 2.95 3.05 0.10 0.93 0.20 
10 RSS 1.29 1.35 1.40 1.30 1.29 1.30 1.29 1.08 1.20 1.34 1.22 -0.12 -2.06 0.04 
11 RSWS 3.00 2.80 3.40 3.80 3.90 3.20 4.20 3.90 4.00 3.25 3.83 0.58 1.85 0.06 
12 RSMD 3.00 2.80 2.70 3.10 3.00 3.20 3.20 3.00 2.80 2.90 3.05 0.15 1.13 0.15 
13 RSMH 4.10 4.35 4.70 4.20 4.90 5.80 5.30 6.00 6.30 4.34 5.85 1.51 6.10 0.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 8.86 9.50 0.64 2.53 0.01 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   76.92% 1.94 0.03 
 
Table 20  
Inpatient – Nurse to Patient Ratio 
 
No HOSPITAL 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
MEAN TEST OF STATISTIC 
Pre Post Difference t-value p 
1 RSCM 2.30 2.40 2.60 2.56 2.78 2.43 2.32 3.00 3.02 2.47 2.69 0.23 1.15 0.15 
2 RSF 3.40 2.98 3.02 3.00 3.01 3.30 2.97 2.94 2.80 3.10 3.00 -0.10 -0.67 0.26 
3 RSP 1.98 1.99 1.87 2.20 1.98 2.00 2.20 2.00 2.30 2.01 2.13 0.12 1.13 0.15 
4 RSJHK 5.73 5.79 5.88 5.83 5.72 5.84 5.80 5.86 5.84 5.81 5.84 0.03 0.85 0.21 
5 RSABHK 2.00 1.60 1.98 2.40 2.01 1.99 2.38 1.87 2.40 2.00 2.16 0.17 0.78 0.23 
6 RSKD 0.18 0.21 0.45 0.32 0.28 0.56 0.19 0.30 1.00 0.29 0.51 0.22 1.17 0.14 
7 RSHS 2.18 2.28 2.25 2.19 2.20 2.38 2.32 2.45 2.51 2.23 2.42 0.19 3.98 0.00 
8 RSDK 3.40 3.20 2.98 3.25 3.23 2.70 2.65 3.20 3.30 3.21 2.96 -0.25 -1.30 0.12 
9 RSDS 4.00 3.20 3.40 3.35 3.30 3.60 3.45 3.02 2.79 3.49 3.22 -0.27 -1.06 0.17 
10 RSS 0.59 0.54 0.92 0.71 0.67 0.81 0.78 0.42 0.63 0.69 0.66 -0.03 -0.24 0.41 
11 RSWS 3.40 3.10 3.70 3.60 3.85 2.98 4.00 3.80 3.72 3.45 3.63 0.18 0.68 0.26 
12 RSMD 3.20 3.00 2.89 3.20 3.00 3.30 3.10 3.15 2.90 3.07 3.11 0.04 0.35 0.37 
13 RSMH 1.88 1.89 1.92 1.79 1.83 1.93 1.90 2.00 2.20 1.87 2.01 0.14 1.88 0.05 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (z value) 2.59 2.64 0.05 1.00 0.16 
Proportion of hospitals that change as predicted (z value)   69.23% 1.39 0.08 
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CHAPTER 6 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
To compares pre- and post- performance of government agency in healthcare 
service that transform into Public Service Agency, this research used study case of 
thirteen central governments hospitals that automatically were changed into Public 
Service Agency in June 2005. The empirical result showed significant improvement in 
out-patient healthcare service. The number of patient in this service grew significantly 
at 1% significant level and 83.33 % hospitals experienced the increase of number of 
patient. In-patient health care service also showed significant growth number, but this 
growth was only experienced by 69.23% of the sample hospitals. It seems that people 
still had no confidence to be treated as inpatient in government hospital. This might 
be caused by the old and obsolete equipment and facilities owned by government 
hospital. To buy new equipment or build new facilities, it needs a lot of fund and 
central government could not provide the fund. Although a third party would like to 
provide the equipment, the regulation for cooperation with third party is still in a 
bottle neck. 
The other weakness of the transformation is that the significant growth in the 
number of patients was not accompanied by the improvement in internal management. 
Most of the hospitals was still using old management system, this old system could 
not detect any fraud and waste because it still recorded transaction manually. This 
condition caused high operating cost to the hospitals, and they might have difficulties 
to make financial report. This condition was shown by insignificant increase in 
profitability indicator. 
In overall result, the performance of the government agencies after 
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transforming into autonomous state agencies did not improve significantly. This 
condition could be caused by two factors. First factor is the internal condition. The 
government agency was not ready to operate business-like, by simply providing 
flexibility it does not mean that they can perform better. It needs good managerial 
skill that is supported by skilled staff and adequate facilities to make organization to 
be able to operate more efficiently and effectively. Administrative requirement 
evaluation is only evaluate agency promises, it does not evaluate agency’s readiness 
for operate in business-like. 
Second external condition, such as Line Ministries, Auditor Board, and also 
all Directorate General under Ministry of Finance, did not have any consensus about 
which flexibility that should be given. Although according to government regulation 
23/2005 all technical procedures must be completed in June 2006, but it had not been 
completed until now. Even by Law, the flexibility should be given, but the relevant 
authorities still hesitated to loosen their control. They doubt that the agency will not 
act arbitrarily after they get the flexibility. 
Without technical procedures, Public Service Agency cannot use their 
flexibility, and without flexibility, government agency could not compete with private 
sector. Korea failed to create executive agency because uncoupling was not 
accompanied with flexibility and consequence (Park, 2010). Wilson (1989) mentioned 
that if we will government to “provide the same product or service delivered by 
private sector” then we should reduce the constraint. 
However, providing flexibility without strengthening the control would be a 
total failure. Although first Public Service Agency has already been created since 
2005, but neither monitoring nor evaluation have been done to the agency. No single 
punishment has been imposed to bad performer government. In the end, there is no 
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difference between Public Service Agency and regular agency, all the red tapes are 
still intact. 
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CHAPTER 7 
7 RECOMMENDATION 
 
To solve the problem, it is suggested that we use control strategy (Park, 2010). 
This is the strategy to control the agency when the organization shift the control away 
from the top and center. Creating autonomous state agencies is basically shifting the 
control from line ministries to the agencies.  
First, it is necessary to get clear on the mission. The mission of creating public 
service agency is to improve service quality and efficient government operation by 
removing the constraint that we believe as the main cause of why government 
agencies have poor performance. It is important to build a consensus among regulator 
so that they would agree with this mission. 
Second, it is essential to set clear and measurable goal for the agency. This goal 
is a contractual agreement between line ministries and their agencies, and it should be 
reliable to measure the improvement in performance. In government regulation No. 
23/2005 it is written about an obligation for the agencies to set a goal, but so far they 
only put activity volume as a target, while service quality and efficiency never 
became a target. Even some of them had already tried to put service quality as a target; 
however it could not be evaluated. Therefore, another important thing is that the target 
should be measurable. 
Third, It is important to give trust. Without trust, nothing will work well. The 
target will not be achieved. If the regulator is still afraid that the agencies will act 
arbitrary, they will never give flexibility. So, the first priority is that we must trust the 
agencies that they have good intention to provide better service. But before we give 
trust we must evaluate them, not only evaluate their target but we must also evaluate 
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the readiness of the agency to operate in business-like. 
Fourth, it is necessary to verify the result. We have to make sure that the agency 
is on the right path by monitoring and evaluating the result. Monitoring and 
evaluation cannot be done only to financial indicator, that is the reason why ministry 
of finance should make coordination with line ministries when make evaluation on the 
agency’s performance.  
Fifth, it is crucial to hold agency accountable for the result. It would be better if 
we give punishment to the agency that could not achieve the target. The most 
reasonable punishment is to write-off the flexibility, but we cannot easily impose it. 
We Should give the agencies three chances, if they still could not improve their 
performance and could not give the explanation, then the punishment could be 
imposed. The reason why the punishment is to write-off the flexibility is that it would 
not make any difference whether they are regular agencies or Public Service Agencies. 
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